Information and communication technologies in Germany : Is there a remaining role for sector-specific regulation? by Knieps, Günter
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Knieps, Günter
Working Paper
Information and communication technologies in
Germany : Is there a remaining role for sector-
specific regulation?
Diskussionsbeiträge / Universität Freiburg i. Br., Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und
Regionalpolitik, No. 102
Provided in cooperation with:
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg im Breisgau
Suggested citation: Knieps, Günter (2004) : Information and communication technologies
in Germany : Is there a remaining role for sector-specific regulation?, Diskussionsbeiträge /
Universität Freiburg i. Br., Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik, No. 102, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/23016Information and communication technologies in Germany: 
Is there a remaining role for sector-specific regulation?  
 




Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik 




In order to analyze the remaining role for sector-specific regulation the focus of 
this paper is on those elements of the Internet periphery and Internet service 
provision, which are strongly based on telecommunications, in particular Inter-
net access and Internet backbone. Section 2 deals with the role of telecommuni-
cations for the Internet, differentiating between local network access and long 
distance network capacity. In section 3 the new regulatory arrangements for 
communications services within Europe, with particular emphasis on Germany, 
are explained. In order to analyze the future role of sector-specific regulation 
from a normative point of view, in section 4 the network economic concept of a 
disaggregated regulatory approach is provided. Section 5 deals with phasing-out 
potentials for sector-specific regulation due to increasing competition within the 
local loop. In section 6 the role of technology-neutral regulation is considered, 
which implies that in an environment of competing network infrastructures sec-
tor-specific regulation should not be extended, but removed. Finally, section 7 
explains the role of competition in the markets for backbone interconnectivity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of government interventions and regulations has strongly different tra-
ditions in the media, IT and telecommunication sectors. The media industry is 
traditionally attributed a function as the bearer of social, cultural and ethical val-
ues within our society. Whereas private communication has traditionally been 
unregulated, broadcast content has traditionally been regulated to some extent 
(public broadcast). The computer / IT industry developed in an unregulated 
manner, under the application of the general competition law. Although the tele-
communications sector is fully liberalized in Germany – as well as in all other 
European countries – there still exist a complex set of sector-specific regulation.   
 
These different approaches of government interventions may be challenged by 
the convergence of the telecommunications, media and IT sectors. On the one 
hand convergence may outpace existing sector-specific regimes. On the other 
hand sector-specific regulation may even be extended in the future to include 
markets at present not regulated, e.g. mobile telephony and new markets, e.g. 
Internet services. The question arises how to achieve the proper role of govern-
ment intervention in a comprehensive institutional framework, leaving markets 
as much freedom as possible. 
 
There are many highly relevant questions related to the Internet, which are not 
the subject of this paper; for example: will there still be a role for content regula-
tion in the future, given the enormous scope of content production and distribu-
tion in the converging markets? (cf. Mestmäcker, 2001). Is there still a serious 
applications barrier to entry problem in the microprocessor market, given the 
enormous potential for middleware threats due to innovations on the browser 
market (cf. Economices, 2000; Fisher, 2000; Sidak, 2001)? What are the poten-
tials and limits of self-regulation in the organisation of access to Internet Proto-
col (IP) number assignments and domain name systems? (cf. Kesan, Shah, 2001; 
Hillebrand, Büllingen, 2001). How is Internet safety (cf. Müller, Rannenberg, 
1999) and the enforcement of property rights within the Internet to be guaran-
teed? (cf. Möschel, 1999; Engel, 1999). 
   2
In order to analyze the remaining role for sector-specific regulation the focus of 
this paper is on those elements of the Internet periphery and Internet service 
provision which are strongly based on telecommunications, in particular Internet 
access and Internet backbone. Access to the Internet requires a connection be-
tween the Internet user and the interface to the Internet service provider (ISP). 
Several access technologies exist: copper, fibre optics, two-way cable TV infra-
structure (CATV network), power line communication and radio in the loop. 
One may differentiate between narrowband and broadband Internet access. 
 
In the past the local loops of the established telecommunications carriers have 
been considered as areas with network-specific market power with a consequent 
need for sector-specific regulation. Gradual phasing out of this sector-specific 
regulation is under debate, due to increasing access alternatives.  
 
Transit and peering arrangements among Internet backbone providers (IBPs) are 
not subject to sector-specific regulation. The agreements that cover interconnec-
tion between IBPs are characterized by private negotiations and are subject to 
non-disclosure rules. From the economic theory of regulation it follows that 
there is indeed no need for sector-specific regulation due to the absence of net-
work-specific market power. The input market of communications bandwidth is 
competitive and each IBP can develop its own logistic concept to optimize its 
own backbone and set of transit and peering arrangements. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 deals with the role of telecommuni-
cations for the Internet, differentiating between local network access and long 
distance network capacity. In section 3 the new regulatory arrangements for 
communications services within Europe, with particular emphasis on Germany, 
are explained.  In order to analyze the future role of sector-specific regulation 
from a normative point of view, in section 4 the network economic concept of a 
disaggregated regulatory approach is provided. Section 5 deals with phasing-out 
potentials for sector-specific regulation due to increasing competition within the 
local loop. In section 6 the role of technology-neutral regulation is considered, 
which implies that in an environment of competing network infrastructures sec-  3
tor-specific regulation should not be extended, but removed. Finally, section 7 
explains the role of competition in the markets for backbone interconnectivity.   
 
 
2.  The role of telecommunications for the Internet 
 
Internet service provision requires several complementary elements belonging to 
the Internet periphery, which are viable on their own, even in the absence of the 
Internet. In contrast to the elements of the Internet periphery, the elements of 
Internet service provision are an inalienable part of the Internet and would not 
exist without the Internet (see Knieps, 2003, p. 219, fig. 1). Internet service pro-
viders (ISP) offer their customers a spectrum of different services (cf. Elixmann, 
Metzler, 2001, pp. 14 ff.), which are classified according to O’Donnell 
(O’Donnell, 2000, pp. 13 ff.) as fundamental networking and internetworking, 
application services and customer relations. 
 
Fig. 1:  Internet Periphery versus Internet Service Provision 
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Terminal equipment (PCs, cellular phones) can be used either without or with 
access to the Internet, although obviously the use of the Internet is not possible 
without any terminal equipment. Content (including broadband) may be pro-
vided via the Internet (e. g. video on demand, customized music and video li-
braries), but there are also other distribution channels available (e. g. cinemas, 
traditional video libraries, traditional broadcasting). Internet service provision 
would be possible even without any content provision, by specialising on inter-
active services (e. g. e-mail). Access to the Internet requires a connection be-
tween the Internet user and the interface to the Internet service provider (ISP). 
Several access technologies exist: copper, fibre optics, two-way cable TV infra-
structure (CATV network), power line communication and radio in the loop. 
One may differentiate between narrowband and broadband Internet access. In 
order to provide Internet services, capacity of long distance telecommunications 
networks (bandwidth) is required. Although in the meantime investments in long 
distance telecommunications infrastructure are strongly motivated by Internet 




3.  New regulatory arrangements for communication services  
 
The basic goal of the 1999 Review of the European Commission (European 
Commission, 1998) was to consider to what extent phasing out of sector-specific 
market power regulation should take place. The key objectives stated at the be-
ginning of the reviewing process were the maximization of the application of the 
general European competition law, the minimization of sector-specific regula-
tion, a rigorous phasing-out of unnecessary regulation and the introduction of 
“sunset clauses” (European Commission, 1998, p. 3). 
 
On 12 July 2000 the European Commission presented its “1999 Review Pack-
age”, with five proposals for Directives of the European Parliament and the 
Council and one proposal for a Regulation. In the meantime these proposals   5
have been enacted: an ONP Framework Directive,
1 an Access and Interconnec-
tion Directive,
2 a Licensing Directive,
3 a Universal Service Directive,
4 a Per-
sonal Data/Protection of Privacy Directive,
5 which came into effect in July 
2003. A Proposal for the regulation of unbundled access to the local loop has 




The legal instrument of a regulation has not been used before in European tele-
communications policy. In contrast to a directive (“Richtlinie”), a regulation 
(“Verordnung”) is the most powerful legislative tool made available by the EC 
Treaty. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States. This means that regulations automatically become part of each Member 
State’s legal system without the need for any intervention by national govern-
ments or national legislators. Unlike directives, which require national imple-
mentation measures,
7 regulations become law in all Member States as soon as 
they are enacted.  
 
                                                 
1  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services (Framework Directive), OJ L108/33, 24. 4. 2002. 
2   Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities 
(Access Directive), OJ L108/7, 24.4. 2002. 
3   Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Au-
thorisation Directive), OJ L108/21, 24.4.2002. 
4   Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on universal service and users‘ rights relating to electronic communications 
networks and services (Universal Service Directive), OJ L108/51, 24.4.2002.  
5   Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy  in the elec-
tronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), 
OJ L 201/37, 31.7.2002. 
6   Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, OJ L336/4, 30.12.2000.  
7    This does not rule out the fact that directives may have direct effect in Member 
States, provided that the provisions of the directive are sufficiently precise and un-
conditional.   6
The incumbent operator with significant market power is obliged to provide full 
unbundled access, as well as shared access to the copper local loop under trans-
parent, fair, and non-discriminatory conditions. The implementation of price 
regulation is left to the national regulatory authorities. As long as the level of 
competition for local access is insufficient to prevent excessive pricing, national 
regulatory authorities are required to ensure that the principle of cost orientation 
is applied.      
 
Both the Framework Directive and the Access Directive provide no clear-cut 
definition of future sector-specific regulation. The Framework Directive pro-
vides a new interpretation of the criterion of “considerable market power”, mov-
ing in the direction of establishing the criterion of dominance on a given market 
as a prerequisite for sector-specific market power regulation. It gives the com-
mission discretionary power to identify a variety of markets for which the intro-
duction of sector-specific regulatory measures should at least be considered. The 
Access Directive already indicates that sector-specific regulation may be ex-
tended to competitive markets (e.g. mobile telephony) as well as newly develop-
ing innovative markets (e.g. the Internet). This would be a definite step back-
wards from the Access Notice of August 1998, which extended the role of com-
petition policy, pointing out the importance of ensuring non-discriminatory ac-
cess to essential facilities.  
 
The question arises whether phasing-out of sector-specific regulation can be ex-
pected. The incumbent operator with significant market power is obliged to pro-
vide full unbundled access, as well as shared access to the copper local loop un-
der transparent, fair, and non-discriminatory conditions (EU-regulation on un-
bundling). Both the Framework Directive and the Access Directive leave the 
planned extent of the future sector-specific market power regulation in long-
distance networks in the dark. Sector-specific regulation of bit-stream access 
may be introduced by national regulatory commissions, based on the EU 
Framework Directive. 
   7
Since 1998 a new telecommunications law has allowed global market entry. 
Taking into consideration the EU review process, in Germany national commu-




4.  The disaggregated regulatory approach  
 
Criteria like relative market share, financial strength, access to input and service 
markets etc. can only serve as a starting point for evaluating the existence of 
market power; but the development of an ex ante regulatory criterion creates a 
need for a more clear-cut definition of market power. This is even more impor-
tant, because “criteria for conjecturing a dominant position” (“Vermutungs-
kriterien”) on the basis of market shares can lead to economically unjustified 
criteria for government intervention in network industries. From a competition 
economics point of view, the use of ex ante sector-specific regulatory interven-
tion constitutes massive interference with the market process and therefore al-




It is important to identify the regulatory basis by means of Stigler’s concept of 
entry barriers, focussing on the long-run cost-asymmetries between incumbent 
and potential entrants (Stigler, 1968, p. 67): 
                                                 
8   Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) vom 22. Juni 2004, Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 
2004, Teil I, Nr. 29, ausgegeben zu Bonn am 25. Juni 2004, pp. 1190-1243.  
9   The traditional methods and approaches in general competition law, both with re-
spect to merger control and the control of abusive practices, are fundamentally dif-
ferent from those of sector-specific regulatory economics. Any mingling of these two 
different approaches cannot but be misleading. The paper examines the question of a 
sector-specific need for regulation and therefore does not comment on merger cases. 
Market shares and turnover are easily measurable and are therefore usually taken up 
as criteria in competition law. However, they must not in any way be confused with a 
sound economic analysis of the effectiveness of active and potential competition. 
When examining a merger case, the competition authorities use a large number of 
criteria to which they attach, by their own discretion, a varying degree of significance 
on a case-by-case basis. For the general control of abusive practices, too, competition 
law envisages a correction of market processes on a case-by-case basis.     8
“A barrier to entry may be defined as a cost of producing (at some or 
every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to 
enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry”.  
 
The sector-specific characteristics of network structures (economies of bun-
dling) are not a sufficient reason to conclude that market power does exist. It is 
necessary to differentiate between those areas in which active and potential 
competition can work and other areas, so-called monopolistic bottleneck areas, 
where a natural monopoly situation (due to economies of bundling) in combina-
tion with irreversible costs exists. It can be demonstrated that the regulation of 
network-specific market power is only justified in monopolistic bottleneck ar-
eas. In all other cases, the existence of active and potential competition will lead 
to efficient market results as in the other sectors of an economy. The pressure of 
potential competition can be sufficient to discipline the behaviour of the active 
supplier, even if he is the owner of a natural monopoly. Such networks are 
called “contestable” (e.g. Baumol, Panzar, Willig, 1982). 
 
An essential condition for the functioning of potential competition in order to 
discipline a firm (natural monopoly) already providing network services is that 
the incumbent firm does not have asymmetric cost advantages in comparison 
with potential entrants. In contrast, if sunk costs are relevant, consumers, who 
would intrinsically be willing to switch immediately to less costly firms, cannot 
do so. Sunk costs are no longer decision relevant for the incumbent monopoly, 
whereas the potential entrant is confronted with the decision whether or not to 
build network infrastructure and thus spend the irreversible costs. The incum-
bent firm therefore has lower decision relevant costs than potential entrants. This 
creates scope for strategic behaviour of the incumbent firm, so that monopoly 
profits (or inefficient production) will not necessarily result in market entry (e.g. 
Knieps, Vogelsang, 1982). 
 
Therefore we can conclude that sector-specific ex ante regulatory intervention in 
order to discipline market power can only be justified in monopolistic bottleneck 
areas, i.e. where a natural monopoly in combination with irreversible costs is 
relevant (e.g. Knieps, 1997a, 1997b). The basic concept of the disaggregated   9
identification of network-specific market power can be illustrated by the follow-
ing table:  
 
 
Table 1: The localization of monopolistic bottleneck facilities 
 





(2) Potential competition 
(contestable networks) 
No natural monopoly 
(bundling advantages 
exhausted) 
(3) Competition among 
active providers 




The network economic concept of monopolistic bottlenecks suggests a connec-
tion with the essential facilities doctrine resulting from US antitrust law, which 
is now also being used increasingly in European competition law (e.g. Knieps, 
2000, p. 104).
10 In accordance with this doctrine, a facility can only be regarded 
as essential if the following two conditions are fulfilled: (1) market entry to the 
complementary market is not actually possible without access to this facility, 
and (2) providers on the complementary market cannot, using reasonable effort, 
duplicate the facility; substitutes do not exist either (e.g. Areeda, Hoverkamp).
11
 
The application of the essential facilities doctrine means that a traditional in-
strument of competition law can be used as a regulatory instrument. A facility is 
regarded as essential when it fulfils the criteria for classification as a monopolis-
                                                 
10   This means that access to ports, airports or railway networks can neither be refused, 
nor granted under conditions that penalize competitors, without factual justification.
11    The fact that use of this facility is essential for competition on the complementary 
market is also occasionally expressed as a third criterion, as it reduces prices or in-
creases the volumes offered. This third criterion, however, only describes the effects 
of access.   10
tic bottleneck facility in the context of the disaggregated regulatory approach. 
The starting point for this approach is to differentiate between those network 
areas in which functional (active and potential) competition is possible, and 
those network areas in which stable network-specific market power can be local-
ized. 
 
The disaggregated regulatory approach involves applying the essential facilities 
doctrine not only on a case-by-case basis, but to a category of cases, namely to 
monopolistic bottleneck facilities. The non-discriminatory conditions of access 
to the essential facilities must be set out in more detail as part of the disaggre-
gated regulatory approach. In doing so, the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine must be seen in a dynamic context. The aim must therefore also be to 
design the conditions of access so as not to hinder infrastructure competition, 
but instead create an incentive for research and development, innovations and 
investments at facility level. This is the only way to establish a balanced rela-
tionship between services and infrastructure competition.  
 
 
5.      Localization of monopolistic bottlenecks within telecommunications 
networks 
 
5.1  Competitive long distance networks 
 
Although the markets for long distance telecommunications services are still 
frequently characterized by economies of scale as well as bundling advantages, 
there is nevertheless competition. Inefficient suppliers are replaced by less ex-
pensive ones because there is free market entry. Even when the incumbent's 
market share is high, inefficient production or services not geared to market re-
quirements will soon lead to a considerable loss in market shares, because cus-
tomers are not tied to a specific supplier and can react without delay to price 
cuts on the market. Excessive prices and inadequate network quality would re-
sult in switching to alternative suppliers, which would appear on the market 
immediately, due to the possibility of free market entry. Thus there remains no   11
regulatory need for disciplining the market power of alternative network provid-
ers. 
 
Since overall free entry became possible, the performance of the German long 
distance telecommunications market has improved strongly: this includes a large 
number of service providers, providing an increasing scope of services, entry of 
several network carriers, strongly decreasing prices for long distance calls etc. 
(cf. Gabelmann, Gross, 2003, p. 113; Stumpf, Schwarz-Schilling, 1999; Knieps, 
2004, p. 10).   
 
The market for long distance transmission capacity is competitive (cf. Laffont, 
Tirole, 2000, p. 98). There have been a large number of newcomers building 
transnational network infrastructure as input for Internet backbone capacity (cf. 
Elixmann, 2000, p. 7). Another possibility is to lease transmission capacity from 
several alternative providers of network infrastructure. In Germany a larger 
number of carriers possess their own fibre-optic networks (Immenga, Kirchner, 
Knieps, Kruse, 2001, table 1, p. 14). The telecommunications transport capacity 
is readily available today from a variety of providers (Kende, 2000, p. 25). 
 
 
5.2  The remaining regulatory problem in the local loop 
 
It is traditionally assumed that local networks constitute monopolistic bottle-
necks, for which neither active nor potential substitutes are available. The EU-
regulation on unbundled access to the local loop proceeded from this assumption 
and concludes that there is a remaining need for regulation of the incumbent op-
erator’s local access network 
   12
Table 2:  
Local telecommunications networks as monopolistic bottleneck facilities 
 
 Natural  monopoly 
(Economies of bundling) 
Irreversible 
costs 
Terminal equipment  _  _ 
Telecommunications services  
(including voice telephone services) 
X _ 
Satellite/mobile networks  X  _ 
Long-distance cable-based networks  _  X 
Local cable-based networks  X  X 
 
 
To the extent and as long as local networks constitute monopolistic bottlenecks, 
ex ante regulation seems justified. Non-discriminatory access to essential facili-
ties has to be guaranteed (e.g. Knieps, 1997a, p. 328). Since unregulated tariffs 
would allow excessive profits to the owners of monopolistic bottlenecks, the 
instrument of price-cap regulation should be introduced (e.g. Beesley,   
Littlechild, 1989). Its major purpose is to regulate the level of prices, taking into 
account the inflation rate (consumer price index) minus a percentage for ex-
pected productivity increase. It seems important to restrict such price-cap regu-
lation to those areas of telecommunications networks where market power due 
to monopolistic bottlenecks is a regulatory problem. In all other subparts of tele-
communications networks price-setting should be left to the competitive market 
forces. 
 
Concentrating on the regulation of the “last mile” does indeed constitute the one 
remaining task of a tailored sector-specific market power regulation. Non-
discriminatory access to this bottleneck facility must be guaranteed for all com-
petitors. The EU Regulation on unbundled access to the local loop contains an   13
obligation for full unbundling as well as line-sharing. In order to guarantee 
competition on long distance telecommunications markets global access to local 
networks seems already sufficient (Engel, Knieps, 1998). In any case, one vari-
ant of non-discriminatory access to the local loop should be considered suffi-
cient to overcome the monopolistic bottleneck problem. 
 
 
5.3    Increasing competition within the local loop 
 
However, it is important to view the application of the essential facilities doc-
trine in a dynamic context. Therefore, one objective in the formulation of access 
conditions must be not to impede infrastructure competition, i.e. not to destroy 
incentives for either research and development activities or innovations and in-
vestments on the facilities level. This is the only way to reach a balance between 
service and infrastructure competition. Local network competition started with 
business customers in urban centres. There the preferred access technology is 
optical fibre (cf. Diestelkamp, 1999, p. 94). However, after the granting of li-
cences for point-to-multipoint microwave systems, the wireless local loop has 
also gained increasing importance (Regulierungsbehörde für Post und Tele-
kommunikation, 1999, p. 24). Consequently, ever since the comprehensive 
opening of the telecommunications market, the pressure of innovation has in-
creased in local networks, too. This has lead to considerable technological vari-
ety (e.g. optical fibre, wireless networks, CATV networks, satellite technology) 
and a consequent increase in varieties of network access. As a consequence, 
broadband technologies no longer have the characteristics of a national monop-
oly. In addition, effective platform competition becomes relevant, where alterna-
tive providers have complete control of all aspects of their networks and the 
subsequent services. Because of these rapid developments the local loop facili-
ties in bigger cities and agglomerations in Germany are increasingly loosing 
their character of monopolistic bottlenecks.  
 
Only recently the gradual phasing out of access networks as monopolistic bot-
tlenecks was considered a futuristic dream, however, the building of parallel 
networks in Germany is now in full swing. Local network competition started   14
with business customers in urban centres. There the preferred access technology 
is optical fibre. After the auctioning of licences for point-to-multipoint micro-
wave systems, the wireless local loop has also gained increased importance 
(Regulierungsbehörde für Post und Telekommunikation, 1999, p. 24). Conse-
quently, ever since the comprehensive opening of the telecommunications mar-
ket, the pressure of innovation has increased in local networks too. This has lead 
to considerable variety in technological platforms, e.g., optical fibre, wireless 
networks, CATV networks, satellite technology, and an increase in product vari-
ety. Because of these rapid developments the local loop facilities in bigger cities 
and agglomerations in Germany are increasingly loosing their character of mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks. Although it is not possible at this point to predict exactly 
how long it will take for the monopolistic bottlenecks in the local loop to disap-
pear completely, there cannot be any doubt that the regulation of monopolistic 
bottlenecks has to be viewed in a dynamic context, so that the potential for phas-
ing out sector-specific regulation in telecommunications can be fully exhausted. 
This means especially that the essential facilities doctrine should not be ex-
tended to facilities that have yet to be built, as this would lead to a distortion of 
incentives preventing the necessary investments in the first place. 
 
 
6.  Broadband versus narrowband access to the Internet:  
Is there a remaining role for sector-specific regulation? 
 
Access to the Internet requires a connection between the Internet user and the 
interface to the Internet. Public switched access to the Internet primarily requires 
access to a local telecommunications network. In addition, a (long-distance) link 




Several access technologies exist: copper, fibre optics, two-way cable TV infra-
structure (CATV network), power line communication and radio in the loop. 
                                                 
12    Oftel (2001), p. 41 differentiates between “wholesale call origination” and “whole-
sale Internet call termination market”.   15
One may differentiate between narrowband and broadband Internet access. Nar-
rowband Internet access takes place on two-pairs copper cables via analogue 
modem and ISDN (integrated services digital network). Broadband Internet ac-
cess can be provided either by upgrading two-pair copper cables by means of 
xDSL (digital subscriber line) technologies – the most popular one being ADSL 
(asymmetric DSL) technology –, CATV based broadband Internet access, as 
well as broadband wireless technology (e. g. UMTS). Convergence and platform 
independence, however, does not mean that these broadband access technologies 
have the same cost-characteristics, and they also have different access quality 
attributes (e. g. mobility, reliability, start-up speed etc.).  
 
There are particularly strong quality differences between low-speed access (nar-
rowband) and high-speed access (broadband). For example, transmission of 100 
text pages takes 120 sec. via modem, 25 sec. via ISDN and 0,4 sec. via ADSL; 5 
colour photos take 22 min. via modem, 5 min. via ISDN and 4-5 sec. via ADSL; 
a 30 minute video takes 38,8 hours via modem, 8,7 hours via ISDN and 8 min. 
via ADSL (cf. Fesenmeier, 2001, p. 17). This already indicates that narrowband 
Internet access does not provide an economically sensible way to consume data-
intensive Internet services like streaming video and interactive entertainment. 
On the other hand, dial-up (analogue modem) access is sufficient for managing 
an e-mail account and surfing the Internet for a few hours a week.  
 
To the extent that the local loops of the established carriers are still monopolistic 
bottlenecks, there is a consequent need for sector-specific regulation (price cap, 
accounting separation, discriminatory free entry). Alternative providers of 
broadband access (e. g. CATV networks) are not yet able to discipline the mar-
ket power of the established provider of the local loop. Line sharing obligations, 
focussing on the stimulation of broadband access are, however, superfluous 
from the perspective of this low-speed access market.  
 
But line sharing regulation seems also not justified from the perspective of 
broadband Internet access. From the dynamic perspective of convergence, the 
separation of the Internet into a large narrowband part on one hand, and a rather 
marginal broadband part on the other seems artificial. For the development of   16
the innovation potential for data intensive Internet services broadband access is 
indispensable. Whereas the local loop of copper pairs can provide, via xDSL, 
one broadband access possibility, there also exist economically feasible access 
alternatives. In particular, mobile Internet access based on GPRS (General 
Packet Radio System Standard) as well as UMTS demonstrates the large innova-
tion potential and evolution of mobile technologies for the Internet (e. g.  Bül-
lingen, Stamm, 2001; Büllingen, Wörter, 2000).  
 
Looking ahead the Europe 2005 Action Plan promotes a multi-platform ap-
proach to broadband development, driven by strong competition between net-
works and services. In the meantime, the focus of the EU commission shifts to 
considering the importance of technology-neutral regulation avoiding favouring 
one technology over another. Technology-neutral regulation is considered to 
allow provision of new services to lead to competition between different net-
work-access methods (facility based competition). As an important conclusion, 
the Commission states “When there is effective facilities-based competition, the 
new framework will require ex-ante regulatory obligations to be lifted” (Com-
mission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 6).  
 
Effective facilities-based competition shall include high-speed access. From the 
perspective of high-speed broadband access, the local loops of the established 
telecommunication carriers therefore loose the characteristics of a monopolistic 
bottleneck. Alternative broadband access technologies (cable modem, UMTS, 
mobile access etc.) create economically sensible alternatives to xDSL. Due to 
the increasing role of product differentiation, based on the different network 
characteristics of these access technologies, the long run convergence towards a 
single globally dominating access technology seems unrealistic. As a conse-
quence, sector-specific regulation of broadband access – in particular line shar-
ing obligations – seems superfluous.  
 
The aim of technology-neutral regulation is also stated in the new telecommuni-
cations law of Germany (§ 1 TKG). This implies that in an environment of com-
peting network infrastructures ex-ante regulation should not be extended but re-
moved. Alternative competing broad-band access technologies should not be   17
regulated. Moreover, the traditional regulation of narrow-band access should not 
be continued for historical reasons, but abolished as soon as narrow-band access 
looses its bottleneck characteristics. Only then will the adequate incentives for 
investments in new network infrastructures be provided and an unbiased infra-
structure and service competition be guaranteed. 
 
 
7.    Backbone interconnectivity: is there a remaining role for  
sector-specific regulation?  
 
7.1  Competitive markets for communications bandwidth 
 
Access to the IP-based backbone network is impossible without access to tele-
communications transport capacity, delivered e. g. by high-speed fibre optic 
networks, coaxial cables and satellite. The performance-price ratio for leading-
edge optical communications technology has been improving rapidly. Develop-
ments in optical technology unquestionably have made massive increases in 
bandwidth possible. New transmission technologies work most effectively over 
new fibre strands that have enhanced optical properties. Growth of bandwidth in 
use for Internet traffic has been dramatic since 1995. However, expectations of a 
bandwidth revolution similar to Moore’s Law on the performance-price ratio for 
computers have not yet been fulfilled. Cost and benefits of additional investment 
into bandwidth have to be counterbalanced. This also includes exploiting the 
benefits of substitution among bandwidth, storage and CPU cycles (cf. Galbi, 
2000).  
 
Communications bandwidth is readily available today from a variety of provid-
ers. IBPs own or lease communications bandwidth that is connected by routers 
which the backbones use to deliver traffic to and from their customers. The un-
derlying network logistics is the TCP/IP protocol. Whereas the IP (Internet pro-
tocol) is responsible for shifting the data packets from router to router, the TCP 
(transfer control protocol) is responsible for the reliability of transmission, in-
cluding error correction. IBPs are also responsible for quality of service and net-
work management, including the capacity control of the backbone network. An   18
additional dimension of Internet backbone services is the organization of inter-
connectivity with other IBPs by means of peering and transit arrangements. 
 
 
7.2  Unregulated interconnectivity: transit and peering 
 
Each IBP forms its own network that enables all end users and content providers 
connected to it to communicate with each other. End users, however, often want 
to be able to communicate with a wide variety of end users and content provid-
ers, regardless of the IBPs involved. In order to provide end users with such uni-
versal connectivity, IBPs must interconnect with one another to exchange traffic 
destined for each other’s end users. It is this interconnection that makes the 
Internet the “network of networks”. 
 
One may differentiate between peering and transit arrangements. Peering part-
ners exchange traffic on a settlement-free basis (bill and keep type), that is, each 
peer terminates without charge the traffic originating with other peers. In con-
trast, with transit arrangements one IBP pays another IBP to deliver traffic be-
tween its customers and the customers of other IBPs (e. g. KENDE, 2000, p. 5). 
Peering used to occur in the U.S. at public peering points, NAPs (network access 
points)
13, where different backbones could exchange traffic. As the result of the 
increased congestion at the NAPs, IBPs turned to bilateral peering arrangements 
(private peering). Because each bilateral peering arrangement only allows back-
bones to exchange traffic destined for each other’s customers, backbones need a 
significant number of peering arrangements in order to gain access to the full 
Internet. The alternative to peering is a transit arrangement between IBPs in 
which one IBP pays another IBP to deliver traffic between its customers and the 
customers of other backbones. Many IBPs have adopted a hybrid approach to 
interconnection, peering with a number of backbones and paying for transit from 
one or more IBPs in order to have access to the backbone of the transit supplier 
as well as the peering partners of the transit supplier.  
                                                 
13  In 1993, the U.S. National Science Foundation, NSF, designed a system of geo-
graphically dispersed NAPs (Kende, 2000, p. 5).    19
Transit and peering arrangements among IBPs are not subject to sector-specific 
regulation, neither by the Federal Communications Commission, nor by the 
regulatory agencies in Europe. The agreements that cover interconnection be-
tween IBPs are characterized by private negotiations and are subject to non-
disclosure rules. From the economic theory of regulation it follows that there is 
indeed no need for ex ante regulation due to the absence of network-specific 
market power. The input market of communications bandwidth is competitive 
and each IBP can develop its own logistic concept to optimize its own backbone 
and set of transit and peering arrangements.
14
 
                                                 
14  Of course, general competition law also applies to transit and peering arrangements. 
However, antitrust proceedings are geared towards dealing with concrete conflicts 
case by case and not towards designing a new ex ante regulatory policy.     20
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